This article first analyses how courts, by applying the right to health as a trump against rationing decisions, have become a relevant healthcare policy-maker in Brazil. Based on empirical findings, it argues that right to health litigation makes the Brazilian public health system less fair and efficient. It then discusses three responses to the negative impact of litigation on the health system: the public hearing held by the Supreme Federal Court and the test established thereafter; the recommendations by the National Council of Justice aimed at building courts' institutional capacity; and Federal Law 12.401/11, which created a new health technology assessment system. Based on a comparative institutional analysis, it concludes that the latter response is the most adequate because it keeps the substantial decisions on the allocation of healthcare resources in the institution that has better capacity to make them and facilitates the judicial control of procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a healthcare policy with the following features: scientific evidence plays almost no role in it because stringent analysis of treatments' effectiveness or safety is not an essential requirement; treatments' cost-effectiveness will not be assessed either and hence the efficiency in the public spending is ignored; the distribution of beneficiaries is not made according to any reasonable principle of distributive justice, but rather to an individual's capacity to litigate; and no matter if other needs are more urgent, the possibility of alternative use of the resources, or the preference of elected representatives, public authorities or other stakeholders, this policy has to be implemented. From any perspective this would be a bad healthcare policy and would never fulfil the requirements of a fair and efficient public health system. However, this is how Brazilian courts are allocating a significant amount of the public resources when enforcing the right to health as an individual trump against healthcare rationing decisions.
The Brazilian Federal Constitution declares that the right to health is a fundamental right of all and a duty of the State, and established a public health system based on the principles of universality, equality of access and comprehensive coverage .
Brazilian judges were also given the power to consider any case in which a right is threatened or violated (Article 5, XXXV), and a claim against the State can be issued via ordinary actions, class actions (ação civil pública), a protection writ against public authorities (mandado de segurança), and special procedures in small-claim courts (juízados especiais), where legal representation is not necessary. These constitutional and jurisdictional provisions have entitled citizens who were denied a certain health treatment by the public health system to sue the State claiming that they have the right to receive the treatment they need from or funded by the public health system. This phenomenon will be called right to health litigation in this article. litigation in the country is concentrated. 4 Litigation in the capital cities of three of these states, where the population is concentrated, will also be analysed.
A. What Is Demanded
Right to health litigation is mainly driven by individual claims for new health technologies, especially drugs, which have not been incorporated in the national public health system's (SUS) pharmaceutical policy. The percentage of cases in which claimants demanded drugs not incorporated in the SUS's pharmaceutical policy is high -80.6% in the state of Rio de Janeiro, 5 and 92.5% in the city of Rio de Janeiro. 6 Other articles, instead of analysing the percentage of lawsuits in which a non-incorporated drug was demanded, assessed the percentage of non-incorporated drugs among all drugs judicially claimed -62.2% in the state of Santa Catarina; 7 68% in the city of Florianopolis; 8 77% and 66.2% in the state of Sao Paulo; 9 and 38% in the city of Sao Paulo.
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It is important to highlight the difference between these two methods for calculating the data. The second method -which counts the number of non-included drugs among all those judicially claimed -underestimates the importance of claims for non-incorporated drugs as access treatments not provided by the public health system. The Brazilian courts have constantly decided that a citizen can judicially claim health treatment against any level of government (Daniel Wang et al., ' The impact of health care judicialization in the city of Sao Paulo: public expenditure and federal organization ' (2013) the main driver of right to health litigation. In many cases, patients demand more than one drug. For example, in the case of the state of Rio de Janeiro it was found that among the drugs judicially claimed, 52% were not incorporated in the pharmaceutical policy. 11 However, when analysing the number of cases in which at least one of these drugs is claimed, the number rises to 80.6%.
One plausible hypothesis to explain this difference is that when people litigate for an expensive medicine, they make the most of their effort and include all the medicines that are in the same medical prescription that contains the expensive drug that is really motivating the litigation. In other words, drugs included in the pharmaceutical policy are 'free riders' and are claimed together with drugs not provided by the health system. Litigants would do it because if they have a judicial decision in their favour, they will receive the drugs in more convenient conditions. The Federal Government, for instance, when complying with a judicial decision, delivers the drug by mail to the patient's house. 12 Moreover, patients make sure that their supply will not be interrupted, as may happen to other patients, since health authorities will not stop providing the drugs because contempt of court is a criminal offence. In the state of Sao Paulo it was found that in 87% of the cases in which patients were litigating for drugs already provided by the public health system, they were also claiming access to nonincorporated treatments. to the pharmaceutical policy because they were prescribed for off-label or off-protocol use. 16 See Machado et al., supra n 14; Pereira et al., supra n 7; Pepe et al., supra n 5; Figueiredo, supra n 6; Chieffi and Barata, supra n 9; Vieira and Zucchi, supra n 10. 17 The values in US dollars in this article were calculated using the average exchange rate in the last month of the respective year.
according to the existing clinical guidelines and protocols (off-protocol use). 18 Similar data was found by Fabiola Vieira and Paola Zucchi: 19 3 out of 10 kinds of drugs for cancer provided by the city of Sao Paulo in compliance with judicial orders were not registered with the ANVISA and most of the rest lacked evidence of their effectiveness in the claimants' circumstances. It is also important to highlight that drugs for cancer are extremely expensive.
In the city of Sao Paulo, just 7.2% of the drugs supplied to comply with judicial orders were drugs for cancer, although 75% of the total spent to buy judicially ordered medicines was spent on oncology drugs.
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Apart from drugs, courts have also ordered the provision of other treatments without their incorporation in the SUS. It did not find strong evidence that they are more effective than the human insulin and it would cost six times more for the SUS to provide the analogous instead of the human insulin, an incremental cost of R$13.5 billion (around US$5.4 billion) over five years. 27 For most judges, however, if the patient has a prescription for the analogous insulin, then her right to health will trump priority-setting considerations.
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Lastly, Ole Norheim and Siri Gloppen developed a methodology using Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) and the country GDP per capita to establish thresholds to grade health treatments according to levels of priority for the population. Applying this methodology to a sample of litigated drugs in Brazil, the authors concluded that most of them should be classified as having a low priority, since they provide small or marginal health benefits at a high opportunity cost for the healthcare system. 
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. Moreover, in the lower courts, the rate of success is absolute:
all cases were judged in favour of the patient. The court's predominant view is that the right to health is an individual right and only in a small number of cases did it consider that economic and policy reasons can be used to justify the non-provision of a drug to a patient. justify the non-provision of the analogous insulin, yet in 84% of the cases courts considered that it was for the patient's doctor, rather than the health authorities, to decide which treatment should be given to them. Hence, according to courts, as long as patients have a prescription affirming that the analogous insulin is necessary, the public health system should provide it without further enquiry as to the quality of the evidence on which the physician's opinion is based.
Similar findings regarding the kind of evidence used by courts was found by Miriam Ventura et al: 39 in 97% of the cases the judicial decision decision was based solely on the medical information provided by the claimants' doctors and no further evidence regarding the quality of the treatment, the need of the patient and the alternative treatments was required.
The problem with this deferential attitude towards a doctor's opinion is that physicians do not always base their prescription on the best scientific evidence. 40 This may happen, for instance, because of the difficulty for practitioners to keep up-to-date with all the new scientific information; the biases in the dissemination of scientific research; the marketing strategies of pharmaceutical companies; and conflict of interests. 41 Should this judicial reasoning be maintained, courts will become an obstacle for evidence-based medicine in Brazil.
In sum, applicants' high rate of success can be explained by the prevalent interpretation of the right to health as an individual trump against priority-setting decisions, coupled with the lack of stringent scientific evidence requirements for the provision of treatment via courts.
This predominant approach to right to health litigation in Brazilian courts is along the lines of the case-law of the STF, the highest court of appeal and the constitutional court.
39 Ventura et al., supra n 36. There were some cases in which the STF departed from the view that the right to health is absolute and recognized that the public health system cannot focus exclusively on the specific needs of the applicant patient and should consider the allocative impact of its decisions. 43 However, after almost 20 years going back and forth trying to establish criteria for the judicial review of rationing decisions, and in spite of the public hearing held by the court (see section 3.A.i), the interpretation that the right to health entitles patients to receive any health treatment they need, because people's health and life trump 'financial and secondary interests of the State', is still an approach that is prevalent within Brazil's highest court.
The STF is still reluctant to accept that the scarcity of resources and the lack of scientific evidence are acceptable reasons to deny healthcare. of the treatment and the objections against its high costs for the public health budget by affirming that:
I cannot accept that the lack of economic resources can be articulated to deny health care to a citizen … according to what I read in the media, the successful treatment for this disease is indeed in Cuba.
Similarly, another Justice (Luiz Fux) reasoned that I am very determined when it comes to hope. I never believed in the version that the pigment rethinosis could not be cured in Cuba. Quite the opposite, I think that they [Cubans] are specialists in this area and there should be hope concerning the cure.
In the most recent case, 45 the STF decided that the public health system should provide a high cost treatment (US$409,500 per year) despite the fact that the treatment has never been incorporated in the SUS nor has it been registered with the ANVISA.
(i) Collective claims
Even though right to health litigation in Brazil is mainly driven by individual lawsuits, 46 there are also cases of collective claims, normally demanding access to drugs not regularly provided by the SUS to a group of identified patients or to all patients in a given jurisdiction (which can be a city, a state, the Federal District or the Federal Government). 47 The former are very similar to individual lawsuits and the only difference is that there is more than one claimant. Courts decide these cases in the same way that they decide individual claims. The latter lawsuits, on the other hand, raise different issues because they are more structural in the 45 STA 761, STF (2014). 46 According to the research carried out by Grinover et al., supra n 32, collective claims represent less than 1% of the right to health litigation cases in Brazil. 47 There are also lawsuits requiring the improvement of health facilities (see Wang and Ferraz, supra n 25).
sense that they are not a dispute between two parties and may cause far-reaching reform that aims at affecting a multiplicity of parties.
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Interestingly, the same courts that show almost no restraint in reviewing rationing decisions in individual cases are more reluctant to decide in favour of claimants when the claim is collective and structural. 49 As already shown, in individual cases courts tend to ignore the impact of their decisions on the public health budget and on the other users of the SUS; the need to set priorities in health expenditure; and the capacity and legitimacy of courts to assess scientific evidence and to make allocative decisions. Conversely, in collective claims with potentially structural effects all these elements are considered by courts to justify their deference to a rationing decision made by health authorities. may unduly affect the public budget and would 'impair the regular functioning of the health system administration, reduce efficiency in patient care and limit the available resources'.
Nonetheless, both decisions emphasized that the drugs in the one case, and the transport, food and accommodation in the other, must be provided if the need is proved individually. In the case SL 256 (2010), apart from the general demand for the SUS to pay for the transport, food and accommodation to all citizens of Araguaína, there was also a request for the provision of these services to some particular individuals, which was granted by the court.
The fact that individual and collective cases tend to be decided differently can be explained by the fact that in individual lawsuits there is the impression that an individual decision has no potential to cause much impact, whereas a collective claim can have largescale policy implications. 52 This impression is false because the aggregate effect of individual lawsuits can be enormous, as will be shown in the next section.
C. The Budgetary Impact
Right . 53 The impact of a few very expensive drugs is also noteworthy: in 2011, the amount spent on the 20 most expensive drugs that were claimed by 52 See Landau, supra n 2. 53 The figures were calculated by using the data provided by The Ministry of Health and The Federal Attorney General's Office, supra n 12. At municipal level, the increase in litigation and its costs is also relevant. In the city of small city of 15,000 inhabitants, more than 50% of the budget for drugs was spent on providing treatment ordered by courts and one single patient won in court the right to receive a treatment that will cost the municipality 16% of its entire budget for drugs. the survey. The result was that more than 50% of the cities affirmed that they were facing an increase in right to health litigation cases. One third of the respondents affirmed that health litigation was an 'important problem' for them. Respondents were also asked to provide information concerning the number of lawsuits they had to respond to and the amount of money that was spent on complying with those cases decided in favour of patients. The result was that the number of lawsuits and the amount spent on complying with decisions in the first semester of 2009 had outpaced the total amount in 2007 and was close to the total in 2008.
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In conclusion, the resources spent by the public health system on complying with judicial decisions are already very significant and are consuming an increasingly large amount of the public health budget. Given that the public health budget's growth cannot keep up with the growth in litigation, courts are having a major impact in reallocating public healthcare resources in Brazil by compelling the provision of treatments without proper appraisal of their safety or effectiveness. Courts show almost complete disregard for policy considerations such as cost-effectiveness, fairness, budgetary capacity of the state and the health needs of the population. Moreover, given that litigation is mainly driven by individual claims, courts are forcing an increase in expenditure on goods that can be individually consumed (e.g. drugs) rather than on common goods and public services that benefit whole populations (e.g. preventative health programmes).
Litigation also creates a two-tier public health system -one upper-tier for those who can litigate and have access to any treatment irrespective of cost, and the other for the rest of the population who have access to more limited care. Healthcare resources are distributed according to a morally arbitrary principle, the capacity to litigate, which is certainly not 66 Ferraz, 'Brazil', supra n 1. evenly distributed in society. 67 It can be expected, however, that right to health litigation will progressively become more accessible as people are better informed, there is more public investment in legal aid, and pharmaceutical companies have incentives to encourage litigation. 68 This can make right to health litigation apparently less unfair, but the fact that more people litigate and thus go up to the upper-tier created by courts means that litigation will affect more severely the rest of the population in the tier below.
THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
The impact of courts on healthcare policies has become too big to be ignored and this section will discuss the three most overarching responses to control its negative impact on the public health system.
Two come from the highest institutions of the judicial branch and the third is the Federal Law 12.401/11. All these proposals have in common the fact that they try to establish a sphere of judicial restraint in which courts should defer to the decisions made by health authorities. Thus, they try to oppose the Brazilian courts' prevailing interpretation that there is an individual right to receive healthcare that cannot be restricted by health authorities´ priority setting decisions or the lack of robust scientific evidence.
However, they disagree on what courts should do when there are claims for drugs not incorporated in the SUS pharmaceutical policy. And this is a central issue since, as discussed in section 2, these claims are the main drivers of right to health litigation in Brazil. 67 There is data indicating that right to health litigation creates an anti-poor bias because claimants from higher socio-economic groups tend to be over-represented in these cases. 
A. Self-Restraint and Institutional Capacity: Responses from the Judicial Branch
Concerns about courts' lack of institutional capacity and the limits of the adjudicative process are some of the most common critiques against courts deciding on the provision of welfare benefits via social rights adjudication. Judges, according to this argument, are trained in law and legal process and have neither the knowledge, expertise, qualifications or experience to decide on multifaceted issues of policies, especially those involving the allocation of scarce resources. Moreover, the adversarial model of adjudication tends to reduce polycentric problems which 'involve many affected parties and a somewhat fluid state of affairs' to bilateral disputes and is poorly prepared to gather and analyse complex social data. 69 Courts will know a lot about a case, but little about its milieu and thus will not be able to see the trade-offs in the competition for budgetary resources or political follow-throughs. 70 On the other hand, those who advocate for a more active role of courts in social rights adjudication affirm that courts, when protecting civil and political rights, also deal with complex issues that may be very similar to those raised by social rights adjudication. Thus, the judicial protection of social rights creates challenges for courts that are not so different from those they commonly face. Furthermore, judges can be provided with relevant information by the parties, their lawyers, witnesses and court appointed individual experts and bodies. Some individual judges can also specialize in social rights adjudication through experience and legal education, in the same way that they specialize in other fields of law.
Finally, the judicial process can be made more participatory -open to amici curiae and public hearing -to enable courts to deal with the complex issues brought before them in cases involving social rights. 71 The response to right to health litigation advanced by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the National Council of Justice (CNJ) can be contextualized in this debate about the capacity of courts and of the adjudicative process to decide properly on the provision of welfare policies. Both institutions recognize that courts have institutional limitations and therefore can only be secondary decision-makers on the issue of healthcare provision.
However, at the same time, they try to overcome these limitations in order to give to courts a prominent role in the judicial review of rationing decisions on a case-by-case basis.
The response advanced by the STF and the CNJ can be better understood as complementary parts of the same policy engaged with right to health litigation. This is not surprising since there is a strong connection between both institutions. The CNJ is a formally autonomous institution, but it is expected that the STF, especially its president, will have a significant influence on the CNJ. The presidency of the CNJ, which has a great deal of responsibility in setting the institution's agenda, is chaired by the Chief Justice of the STF.
Moreover the STF has the prerogative to appoint other two members of the CNJ. The affinity between the recommendations of the CNJ and the decisions of the STF will be made clearer in the following sub-sections.
(i) The Supreme Federal Court: public hearing and the establishment of a test
The STF is the last court of appeal in the Brazilian judiciary and the constitutional court. It held a public hearing in 2009 with over fifty experts (including healthcare professionals, public authorities, legal scholars and civil society representatives), heard over a period of six days, to supply the STF with 'technical, scientific, administrative, political and economic' information related to the right to health litigation phenomenon.
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Gargarella, 'Dialogic justice in the enforcement of social rights: some initial arguments' in Yamin and Gloppen, supra n 1. 72 Gilmar Mendes, 'Opening of the public hearing n. 4 at the Supreme Federal Court', Supreme Federal Court, 2009, available at
The public hearing was motivated by the acknowledgment that litigation has a significant impact on the public health system and that the court needed support from different specialists and stakeholders in order to make better decisions. 73 Chief-Justice Gilmar
Mendes (as he then was) held the public hearing and declared in his opening speech that 'either the idea that courts should have no role in healthcare issues or that there is a right to any health treatment is untenable' and that a balanced view should be found, taking into consideration 'all the judicial decisions' implications without compromising … the right to health'. 74 Lastly, he affirmed that he expected the 'public hearing would result not only in technical information conducive to assisting in the court's analysis of the cases, but also in support for a broader and pluralist debate for the improvement of health policies'.
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Initiatives like the public hearings can be seen as a device to defend more activist courts against critics concerning their institutional capacity, but also as a tool for helping them implement their potential for enhancing democracy and participation. Accordingly, there is an expectation that courts can be a forum to ensure that norms are created and applied through a 'collective and inclusive discussion'. 76 deliberation and, therefore, using a participative procedure only to legitimize a foregone conclusion.
With regard to its substantial aspect, the test established by the STF sets some criteria to distinguish those cases when the court should defer to the allocative decisions made by health authorities and those when it should oblige the SUS to offer a treatment allegedly needed by the patient but denied by the government (see Chart below).
Chart 1 -The STF's test to determine a claimant's right to receive a health treatment
The first criterion establishes that the government cannot deny citizens treatments already incorporated in the SUS, namely, those on the official lists or recommended by clinical protocols and guidelines. If the claimed treatment has not been incorporated, then there is a duty to provide it only if it has been registered with the National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA); there is no adequate alternative treatment provided by the SUS; and the claimed treatment has been available in the market for a long time. Lastly, the criterion that allows courts to order the supply of a treatment if it has been available in the market for a long time seems to ignore the cost-effectiveness analysis and policy considerations in deciding the provision of healthcare. 84 The fact that a drug is 82 A longer discussion of this test was made elsewhere, see Wang, supra n 43. 83 In sum, the public hearing has not prevented the STF from underestimating the complexity of healthcare policies and overestimating the capacity of courts to make allocative decisions in healthcare. The same can be said about the response of the CNJ, as will be seen in the following section.
(
ii) The National Council of Justice: building courts' institutional capacity
The CNJ is part of the Brazilian judicial branch, but has no judicial power and cannot review Recommendation 31/2010 'recommends to courts the implementation of measures aiming at supporting judges and other legal professionals in order to assure better solution for the judicial claims related to healthcare'. It affirmed that the main problems caused by right to health litigation in Brazil were due to the lack of clinical information available to judges in the claims for drugs not approved by the ANVISA. It also stated that the health authority's managerial capacity, the existing public policies, the organization of the SUS, and the need to guarantee the sustainability and manageability of the SUS all have to be taken into consideration by courts.
Therefore, the CNJ recommended to Brazilian courts to: a) Make technical support from doctors and pharmacists available to assist judges in assessing the clinical evidence presented by the litigants in healthcare related cases; b) Advise judges to analyse the cases based on complete and comprehensive information; to avoid the provision of drugs not registered with the ANVISA or experimental drugs; and to consult, whenever it is possible, health authorities before an interim decision be made; c) Include health law legislation as a subject to be examined in the public entrance exams for judges and d) Take judges to visit public health units.
It also recommended the schools responsible for preparing those admitted to the public entrance exams to become judges 85 to a) include health law in their curricula and b) organize seminars with judges, public prosecutors and health authorities in order to promote common views on this topic.
The CNJ, apart from establishing a sphere of self-restraint, innovated in trying to build courts' institutional capacity to decide on the provision of health treatments. 86 Better trained, informed and assisted judges can impact on right to health litigation in two ways.
First, judges with more information will be able to filter out claims based on poor evidence. Moreover, the more courts know about healthcare policies, the more wary they should be in reviewing the health authorities' rationing decisions because they will be given a broader perspective on the problem than one that is confined to their decision on a claim for 85 In Brazil, lower level courts' judges are chosen via public entrance exams. 86 Some courts are already implementing some of the recommendations made by the CNJ by creating 'technical support services' composed of doctors, nurses, pharmacists and nutritionists to advise judges in health care litigation cases. See, for instance, Sidharta Ferreira and Aline da Costa, 'Technical advice centers and "judicialization of health": constitutional or unconstitutional?' (2013) 20 Revista da SJRJ 219.
the fulfilment of an individual need. They will understand, for instance, that the SUS has to make 'tragic choices', that there are opportunity costs, and that rationing is necessary. 87 .
Second, by building courts' institutional capacity the CNJ tries to create better conditions for judges to second-guess health authorities' decisions concerning the provision of health treatments. It is important to note that Recommendation 31/2010 follows on the public hearing held by the STF and the test established thereafter. According to this test, courts should order the provision of treatments already incorporated in the SUS and, when there is evidence that a patient needs a treatment that is available for private purchase and no effective alternative is offered, then non-incorporated drugs can be provided via judicial order. Thus, the effort to provide courts with more knowledge, information and technical support from doctors and pharmacists would allow them to decide if the alternative treatment offered by the SUS is effective or if the patient really needs the treatment available in the private market but not provided by the SUS.
However, it is questionable whether better trained judges assisted by doctors and pharmacists will be able to acquire and evaluate factual information to make sound policy decisions. Even if we reduce these decisions to a mere medical/scientific issue, it would be unrealistic to expect that a group of doctors and pharmacists will have the necessary diversification of expertise to be able to make a comprehensive scientific assessment of all the treatments that are being litigated for. This task is even more daunting considering that the main driver of litigation is a wide array of new medical technologies for various health problems. In countries where health technology assessment is taken seriously, this task is carried out by highly specialised and resourced agencies and scientific committees that are able to gather and assess large amounts of data applying stringent scientific methods and with a constant dialogue between stakeholders and experts. 87 See Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit, Tragic Choices (1978).
Nonetheless, let's assume, for the sake of the argument, that courts supported by health professionals can create a system that is able to assess treatments using sound evidence. That will still not solve all the problems caused by right to health litigation because the provision of healthcare in a health system is not merely a medical problem that science can solve. It is a matter of public policy. Doctors and pharmacists will not be able to consider costeffectiveness, affordability, opportunity costs, public health priorities and the preferences of other stakeholders before deciding on the provision of treatment.
Even if we add specialists from other fields to the group of medical experts, it would still be naïve to expect that their decision would give a ready-made answer to whether or not a treatment should be provided. Priority setting involves problems of social fact (e.g. how a certain disease affects the population's health), polycentricity (e.g. the socio-economic effects of providing a given treatment on the public health system), politics (e.g. the priorities of a community with regards to healthcare spending) and morality (how to distribute healthcare fairly given that we cannot give everything to everyone) that cannot be reduced to a technical decision that can be objectively made by a body of experts attached to courts.
Public policy decisions are inescapably speculative and the impact of which is hard to predict. 88 It is the role of managerial capacity to make and review decisions according to the consequences and to respond promptly to changing circumstances. This highlights the importance of the decisions' procedural legitimacy. Since there is no unequivocal right decision, it is essential that it be made according to a fair procedure.
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From this perspective, the expectation that courts make good administrative and political decisions with better trained judges and expert assistance, but without the virtues of the public administration (e.g. expertise and flexibility) and of a politically accountable 88 King, supra n 78 at ch. 9. 89 See Norman Daniels, Just Health: meeting health need fairly (2009).
process, seems untenable. 90 Moreover, those advantages of the political and administrative decisions may be undermined by decisions of reviewing courts which reverse choices from the political and administrative sphere based on a different source of evidence.
91
To overcome some of these obstacles, one could imagine the CNJ recommending the creation of a very sophisticated 'bureaucracy under judicial auspices' to carry out health technology assessments and decide on whether a treatment should be provided in each case.
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Even if we assume that courts have the resources and capacity to do so, it can be questioned whether this would be more sensible than relying on, and controlling, the procedure used on the administrative level by health authorities who have the structure and expertise to perform this task. The section that follows will discuss this argument further. 
CONCLUSION
Right to health litigation in Brazil rules out from the start the possibility of choosing the treatments that will do the most good from a population perspective. It makes the public health system less efficient because an enormous amount of resources is spent based on poor evidence and in a way that does not maximize the benefits that it can provide. It also creates unfairness because it generates a two-tier public health system and distributes resources according to patients' capacity to litigate. 97 This is perceived as a way to make sure that health authorities do a good job and, if they do not, to substitute judicial rulings for their decisions.
However, the question is whether, and under what circumstances, they can do a better job than the primary decision-maker. 98 Why should courts try to build their own institutional capacity and legitimacy to make substantial decisions on the provision of healthcare when there is an institution created and equipped in the administrative level specifically to make them? If the administrative procedure is good (transparent, accountable and based on robust evidence and fair principles), then why replicate it under the auspices of courts? It would be naïve to expect that courts create a procedure to decide on the provision of healthcare that is 97 Horowitz, supra n 70 at 141. 98 Ibid. at 207 better than the one that can be made at the administrative level. This would also be unnecessarily costly.
If health authorities' procedure is defective, then it would be better if courts controlled the procedure, occasionally ordering a decision to be remade, rather than ignoring more or less entirely what was decided by health authorities and trying to decide it from scratch.
Instead of engaging with scientific issues (e.g. whether treatment A is better than B) or moral, economic and policy reasons (e.g. to balance the needs of a claimant against those of others and the budgetary capacity of the state), which courts are ill-suited to do if compared with health authorities, courts could do a better job in overseeing and scrutinizing the procedure through which these decisions were made and guaranteeing the adequate conditions for a fair and rational decision. as being more legitimate and hence attract greater judicial deference. 100 And considering that courts should take into account the quality of the public authorities' inquiry into the specific case,it also makes sense for them to exercise deference for epistemic reasons.
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This would not make the right to health non-justiciable, but would imply a significant change in the way it is interpreted by courts. Instead of judging the right to health as an individual trump against rationing decisions made by the public health system, it would be applied as the right to access a healthcare system in which resources are distributed according to a fair process, which includes duties of transparency, accountability, consistency and use of adequate evidence. 102 Future research will be able to assess the impact of Federal Law 12.401/11 in order to test whether the most adequate response to right to health litigation was actually effective. If so, then it will be interesting to note the paradox that litigation, by creating unfairness and inefficiency, may have forced the SUS to be fairer and more efficient.
